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Legal discourse shapes our beliefs about the experiences and
capacities of the human species, our conceptions of justice, free-
dom and fulfillment, and our visions of the future .... The peculi-
arity of legal discourse is that it tends to constrain the political
imagination and to induce belief that our evolving social arrange-
ments and institutions are just and rational, or at least inevitable,
and therefore legitimate .... It is, in short, the vocation of legal
thought to render radical, nonliberal visions of freedom literally
inconceivable.
In the electronic age everything textual is potentially salvageable.
However, retrievable professional history will unlikely note the begin-
nings of 1989. That is not to say the inhabitants of this time have
noticed any stark changes in the patterns of triumph and conflict in
their lives, or that the events chronicled here represent the actual first
signs of unrest. Changes in the way we think and who we are rarely
come wrapped in the ribbons of official pronouncements. Yet in Janu-
ary, 1989, three texts, without connection to each other in ostensible
context or institutional sponsorship, and which might alert the people
who live now and who constitute history, circulated in the legal
profession.
On the surface the texts are the artifacts of the extraordinarily
* Kenneth Casebeer is a Professor of Law at the University of Miami School of Law. He
received an A.B. from Georgetown University in 1971 and a J.D. from Harvard Law School in
1974.
1. Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358, 1358
(1982).
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ordinary: On January 27, 1989, the fourth Robert Cole Lecture,2 an
annual honorific speech delivered by a distinguished jurist, created the
usual oohs and ahs of an ambitious, young law school. The anticipa-
tion and emotion was simply heightened because the speaker was Wil-
liam J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice for more than thirty years, and
admired by many as a hero of their causes, and by all for his human-
ity and tough honesty in its pursuit. On January 23, 1989, the United
States Supreme Court -announced its opinion in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.,3 an important, though not an apparently path break-
ing, case in a contested area of affirmative action and civil rights. On
January 19, 1989, the Executive Director of the American Associa-
tion of Law Schools, doing what trade groups apprehending some
public distrust and criticism classically do, circulated a "Draft Report
of the Special Committee on the Ethical and Professional Responsibil-
ities of Law Professors."4 No connection exists between the events
except that they all concern elite actors within the legal profession.
No cross reference establishes that any of the actors were aware of the
other events at the time they wrote their texts.5 Perhaps the only
noticeable glimmer of warning consisted in the title of Justice Bren-
nan's speech, "Are Citizens Justified in Being Suspicious of the Law
and the Legal System?" 6 and in the fact that the three texts were in
circulation within two weeks of January 16, 1989, a night which
began three days of civil disturbance in Overtown, one of the most
segregated of the low-income Black sections of the City of Miami.
Three people died and hundreds were arrested or injured as long-
standing grievances of the community erupted over a police shooting.7
2. Brennan, Are Citizens Justified in Being Suspicious of the Law and the Legal System?,
43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 981 (1989). To date the annual Robert Cole Lecture Series has always
been presented by a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. See Burger, The High Cost of
Prison Tuition, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 903 (1986); Rehnquist, The Supreme Court.: "The First
Hundred Years Were the Hardest," 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475 (1988); Stevens, The Third
Branch of Liberty, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 277 (1986).
3. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
4. Association of American Law Schools, Draft Report of the Special Committee on the
Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors (Jan. 19, 1989) (copy on file with
the University of Miami Law Review) [hereinafter Ethical and Professional Responsibilites of
Law Professors].
5. Justice Brennan participated in the decision in City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 739-57,
and undoubtedly knew of the Overtown riot, infra note 7 and accompanying text, when he
delivered his speech.
6. Brennan, supra note 2, at 981.
7. See Calm Prevails in Black Community, Miami Herald, Jan. 20, 1989, at IA, col. 1; A
Painful Cry: What Does It Take To Be Heard?, Miami Herald, Jan. 19, 1989, at IB, col. 1;
Prominent Blacks Feel Frustration, Miami Herald, Jan. 19, 1989, at IC, col. 5; Violence Ebbs,;
City Sets Probe, Miami Herald, Jan. 19, 1989, at IA, col. 4; Hiaasen, For Poorest, Life Only
Gets Worse, Miami Herald, Jan. 18, 1989, at IB, col. 1; Hines, Overtown Feels Pain,
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Yet beneath the surface that future historians will scan, deep ide-
ological connections draw these texts together, not as a unified state-
ment, but as the surface manifestations of a dialectical struggle over
the values and assumptions by which American life is and will be
organized. As part of this pervasive contest over the meaning of
social life, all three texts connect the meaning and understanding of
our circumstances through the role of law in structuring social life.
All three texts also are written in the name of establishing social jus-
tice. The stakes of this larger contest both depend in part on and
determine whether as human selves we will structure our society's
patterns of daily life on the preinstitutional or presocial assumptions
of self-interest rationalization,' or whether we will organize daily life
around institutions that allow and demand direct ethical and political
participation and responsibility, in the process defining self-conscious
expression. Will our mechanism of social discipline reflect only the
teachings of the market and the automatic limits of personal
resources, or will social discipline require personal accountability and
involvement in justifying both discrete actions and the conditions
which give rise to actions?9 These are choices rarely faced directly in
such circumstances as the teaching of law students. It is an accident
that these three texts of January, 1989, have been noticed in conjunc-
tion at all. But it is not an accident that the warning sounded by
Justice Brennan will be blunted by the counterassumptions of the
present foundational and interpretive law of the Constitution and the
dominant assumptions of the legal education profession.
It is the law and the legal system whose present self-understand-
ing cannot acknowledge what Justice Brennan hears-the cries of our
interdependence as social beings.' 0 Without fail, the relationship of
freedom and access to social justice will be addressed, whether in the
halls of academe, the corridors of the courts, or the streets. Whether
the legal profession is attentive and relevant, or indeed whether it will
Frustration, Miami Herald, Jan. 18, 1989, at IA, col. 1; Peaceful Holiday Turned to a Night of
Violent Protest, Miami Herald, Jan. 18, 1989, at IA, col. 1; Rage Spreads From Overtown,
Miami Herald, Jan. 18, 1989, at IA, col. 5; Police Chase Sparks Violence, Miami Herald, Jan.
17, 1989, at IA, col. 6; Why Black Community Was Tense, Miami Herald, Jan. 17, 1989, at
13A, col. 1.
8. For examples of the debate over wealth maximization models of social decision, see
Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485-710 (1980) and A
Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811-972 (1980).
9. See Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1289-90 (1985)
(relating the inevitable politics of legal construction of our selves to social practices).
10. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 2, at 986 ("Certainly, we as lawyers know the difference
between formal and real equality, and must therefore lead the fight to close the gap between
the two.").
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paint itself out of significant involvement, remains to be decided, now
that an ordinary January has passed into memory.
I. THE SPEECH
Justice Brennan's speech" was in many ways a stirring and
thoughtful commentary on the contemporary practice of law, a call to
our higher natures and a challenge to include social justice on the
legal agenda. In style and theme, the speech could have been deliv-
ered at countless law school commencements. On the surface, the
speech begins with a warning that:
[m]any citizens are suspicious of the law and the legal system....
First, the law and the legal system are challenged as being
basically inequitable to so many who are unable to participate fully
in the economic, political, and social life of the nation .... The
second suspicion is even more fundamental and has even more
ominous portent, for it casts a cloud over the very rule of law. Law
is regarded as an obstacle to, rather than an instrument of, the
creation of a just and generous society.' 2
Beneath the surface, the speech revolves around two astonishing,
but significant supporting theses. The first thesis is that American
society's failure adequately to address issues of social justice'3 resulted
from the limitation of relevant government since the 1930s to pro-
grams of the administrative, welfare state.14 Justice Brennan laid the
failure of the "New Deal" and subsequent "Wars on Poverty" to the
conceptual inability to extend programs providing access to social
resources, and to social and political participation, into legal recogni-
tions in the form of rights guaranteeing human dignity.15 Eradication
of poverty, real equality of resources-in short, distribution-was
thought to be the domain of legislation, and not to be independently a
part of purely legal justice. The failure of the New Deal substantially
to change American society and to assure greater equality lay in the
intentional segregation of law, as adjudication of rights, from politics,
11. Id. For a recent review of Justice Brennan's jurisprudence, see Reason, Passion, and
Justice Brennan: A Symposium, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 25-234 (1988). See also Address of
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 6 U. HAW. L. REV. 1 (1984); Brennan, "How Goes the
Supreme Court?," 36 MERCER L. REV. 781 (1985); Brennan, Reason, Passion, and the
"Progress of the Law," 10 CARDoZo L. REV. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Brennan, Reason and
Passion]; Brennan, The Equality Principle in American Constitutional Jurisprudence, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 921 (1987) [hereinafter Brennan, Equality Principle].
12. Brennan, supra note 2, at 981-82.
13. For current statistics and explanation of increasing disparities of wealth and income in
the United States, see Reich, As the World Turns, THE NEW REPUBLIC 23-28 (May 1, 1989).
14. Brennan, supra note 2, at 982.
15. See id. at 986.
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as ,legislation of distributive policies. 16 The second supporting thesis
is that the false consciousness of this attempted insulation of law from
politics belies the role of lawyers in establishing norms of social
organization, and the norms and justifications of the operation of the
legal system itself.'7 Justice Brennan explained that beyond the stra-
tegic and pervasive function of lawyers in organizing social behavior,
lawyers, both within the legal system and in general public settings,
articulate legal justifications and are treated authoritatively on ques-
tions of practice.'" They control access in the most important sense:
Lawyers, before any other group, must continue to point out how
the system is really working-how it actually affects real people.
They must constantly demonstrate to courts and legislatures alike
the tragic results of legal nonintervention. They must highlight
how legal doctrines no longer bear any relation to reality .... 19
If the law is iniquitous as charged, it is so by virtue of what law-
yers and courts include in what counts as law, and that, in turn, is
known by what is kept out. Nothing but ideology keeps alternative
political theories and values, and the people they represent, out of the
discourse defining the legal rules by which persons and institutions
resolve conflicts and determine social winners and losers. Nothing but
politics keeps access to the procedures constructing legal discourse
limited by costly services and costly procedures. Nothing but law
keeps the excluded from being accounted in the legal processes and
legal content of reproducing social organization and legitimizing
social conditions.2" The question of law's connection to social justice
depends on what is legally conceivable. The experience of democratic
social life depends on the available and manifest understandings of
equality, including legal actions.2' The barrier to recognizing justice
16. For a parallel contemporary recognition of the failure in political theory to move the
welfare state beyond legislation, see CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE (J. Keane ed. 1988)
[hereinafter Keane]. In the introduction to CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE, Keane states:
Political controversies surrounding the failures of Keynesian welfare-state
policies are also stimulating interest in the old distinction between the state and
civil society. In the hands of its social democratic advocates, the welfare-state
model supposed political power to be the most important condition of achieving
more co-operative, democratic and egalitarian forms of life.
Id. at 9.
17. See Brennan, supra note 2, at 981-82.
18. See id. at 983.
19. Id. at 986.
20. See generally J. HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS (T. McCarthy trans. 1975) (on the
relation of domination and legitimation).
21. See Brennan, Equality Principle, supra note 1I, at 921. Justice Brennan urges:
I hope rather that the profession, practitioners and judges alike, still are
concerned with providing freedom and equality of rights and opportunities, in a
realistic and not formal sense, to all the people of this nation .... None of us in
1989]
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in law is thus overcoming injustice.22
It is no accident that Justice Brennan noted dissatisfaction with
both "law" and the "legal system," and no accident that the aliena-
tion produced by inequality should be articulated in both instances as
exclusion, and moreover, as lacking the legitimacy of exclusion pro-
duced by any authentic participation.23 Finally, it is no accident that
the claimed justifications for the neutrality of the felt exclusions-the
neutrality of the marketplace for legal services and the neutrality of
insulating law from the legislation of administrative politics-should
seem empty to those historically disfavored in economic and political
markets as well as in the substance of law's rules and rights.24 It is no
accident because the seemingly separate indictments of the justice of
the laws and operation of the legal system and the legal barriers to
more just social conditions share the same injustice-the insulation of
the realm of the law from the conditions of social, civil participation.
The politics of the separation of law and politics is itself part of the
law. According to Justice Brennan, any credible response to the
cloud on the rule of law must therefore rethink legal practice in order
to address the very basis by which law is known-law's exclusions:
"The mechanism by which society makes choices and accommodates
conflicting social interests has always been preeminently the law,
embracing by that amorphous term not simply the courts, but more
broadly, all the ways in which citizens structure the relationships that
constitute society. "25
Justice Brennan's argument that the failure of the New Deal was
a legal failure invokes a particular image of law. The dominant image
of law then and now, of adjudicated right defining restraints on gov-
ernment and individuals, frustrated Senator Robert Wagner during
the New Deal:
It may seem paradoxical that the gospel of freedom for busi-
ness enterprise nurtured a legal system which indulged solely in
restraints and prohibitions. But this was inevitably the case. You
could not define the terms of free competition. You could not regu-
the ministry of the law, whether teacher, practitioner, or judge, can deny that the
law still tenaciously clings to the tradition that for so long isolated law from the
boiling and difficult currents of life as life is lived.
Id. at 922.
22. See generally E. Cahn, A SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1964) (overcoming injustice is more
important to defining justice than defining that concept directly).
23. See Brennan, supra note 2, at 981.
24. For the minor role played by the concept of equality in foundational American law
and legal discourse, see Katz, The Strange Birth and Unlikely History of Constitutional
Equality, 75 J. AM. HIST. 747 (1988).
25. Brennan, supra note 2, at 985.
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late laissez-faire. You could not schematize planlessness. You
could merely outlaw practices which were deemed to interfere with
the inordinate play of enterprise.26
Justice Brennan's countervision of law encompasses more than gov-
ernment: Law establishes the standards and permissions of enforcea-
ble and justifiable social behavior. Law does so by positive
governmental intervention in the activities or resources of individuals,
by placing limits on individual and governmental behavior, and by
relating these two types of action by creating positive entitlements
which government and individuals must respect. In general, the law
constitutes power by mixing such legal devices to channel social pat-
terns of behavior-favoring some, hindering others." Moreover, the
particular form of power so constituted is that of a rational, in princi-
ple justifiable, relationship of social behavior to official norms.2"
As the framers of the United States Constitution understood, this
larger notion of the legal state-as the collection of practices that
articulate legitimate action and choices-will make all parts of gov-
ernment political targets, the control of which is desired for the pro-
motion of self-interest.29 As E.P. Thompson, the English historian,
observes about an earlier period of English law:
The law when considered as institution (the courts, with their
class theatre and class procedures) or as personnel (the judges, the
lawyers, the Justices of the Peace) may very easily be assimilated
by those of the ruling class. But all that is entailed in "the law" is
not subsumed in these institutions. The law may also be seen as
ideology, or as particular rules and sanctions which stand in a defi-
nite and active relationship (often a field of conflict) to social
norms; and, finally, it may be seen simply in terms of its own logic,
rules and procedures .. .
To work as more than brute club, the law must do more than organize
markets, subsidize interest groups, or quash reform. To actually func-
26. Wagner, Planning in the Place of Restraint, 22 SURV. GRAPHIC 395, 396 (1933).
27. Brennan, Equality Principle, supra note 11, at 923. Justice Brennan wrote: "The
almost incredible intricacy and pervasiveness of the webbing of statutes, regulations, and
common law rules in this country that surround every contemporary social endeavor of
consequence give lawyers and judges a peculiar advantage, as well as responsibility, in coming
to grips with our social problems." Id.
28. See Brennan, Reason and Passion, supra note 11. Brennan's version is, of course, not
the only alternative conception of law as more inclusive than government action. See Keane,
supra note 17; LAW, STATE AND SOCIETY (B. Fryer, A. Hunt, D. McBarnet & B. Moorhouse
eds. 1981) [hereinafter Fryer]; STATES AND SOCIETIES (D. Held, J. Anderson, B. Gieben, S.
Hall, L. Harris, P. Lewis, N. Parker & B. Turok eds. 1983).
29. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 53 (J. Madison) (Modern Library College ed.).
30. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 260
(1975).
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tion as ideology, legal justification demands that the social arrange-
ments established under law be conceptually challengeable as part of
the construction of law itself. Legal contests must be seen, in some
sense, as fair contests over real alternative definitions of, for example,
property, or corporate form, or equality:
If the law is evidently partial and unjust, then it will mask
nothing, legitimize nothing, contribute nothing to any class's
hegemony. The essential precondition for the effectiveness of law,
in its function as ideology, is that it shall display an independence
from gross manipulation and shall seem to be just. It cannot seem
to be so without upholding its own logic and criteria of equity;
indeed, on occasion, by actually being just."
The New Deal created the perception and partial reality that
government held a responsibility to ameliorate the inequalities of cir-
cumstance in part created by government itself. That responsibility,
however, was limited to legislative interventions by strategic choice.
These legislative programs were of course vulnerable to shifting con-
ditions and fiscal trade-offs in a way that legal rights resist, albeit
within an alternative form of politics. But, despite the fact that the
adjudicated law also contributed to the government's responsibility
for inequality and the conditions generating inequality, of greater
long-term importance, the creation of new rights and the imposition
of affirmative legal obligations on government were not part of the
government reform strategy.32
What began largely as legislative reform strategy, now may be
seen as tragically flawed. The idea that rights, of whatever status,
must be purely negative barriers to others' actions, rather than affir-
mations of obligatory response, 3 is made up by lawyers and judges in
31. Id. at 263.
32. See E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966). Not all
New Deal legislation assumed the separate character of constitutional right and political
program. For a contrary vision underlying the Wagner Act, see Casebeer, Holder of the Pen:
An Interview with Leon Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 285
(1987). See also Wagner, supra note 26.
33. Justice Brennan explains negative and positive liberty in the following terms:
The problem with the [Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)] decision
was not that it lacked rationality. The Court's argument, premised on a notion
of "negative liberty" or liberty as freedom from restraint, made logical sense-
the state law in question did indeed place a restraint on liberty as defined by the
Court. The problem with the argument lay in its premise-that a concept of
negative liberty was the appropriate starting point for the analysis. This
conception of liberty was rooted in "a philosophy that had served its day," but
was ill-suited for modern problems. In the twentieth century, Cardozo thought,
it was essential "to consider no contract worthy of respect unless the parties to it
are in relations, not only of liberty, but of equality. If one of the parties be
without defense or resources, compelled to comply with the demands of the
[Vol. 43:989
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the form of assumptions of particular institutional practices of the
legal system. Unfortunately for Justice Brennan and those who see
present law as a barrier to the creation of a more just society, the
current conceptualization of law and the assumptions about human
behavior that drive it are against them.
Even so, within the cramped commitments of the present
Supreme Court, Justice Brennan has turned the law's dominant rheto-
ric against its own worst nature in opinions such as Plyler v. Doe,34 an
equal protection challenge to the state of Texas' scheme of local prop-
erty-based expenditures on education and the exclusion of children of
illegal aliens from school attendance:
Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring
entry into this country, coupled with the failure to establish an
effective bar to the employment of undocumented aliens, has
resulted in the creation of a substantial "shadow population" of
illegal migrants-numbering in the millions-within our borders.
This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocu-
mented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a
source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our
society makes available to citizens and lawful residents. The exist-
ence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for a
Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality
under law.
The children who are plaintiffs in these cases are special mem-
bers of this underclass. Persuasive arguments support the view
that a State may withhold its beneficence from those whose very
presence within the United States is the product of their own
unlawful conduct. These arguments do not apply with the same
force to classifications imposing disabilities on the minor children
of such illegal entrants....
other, the result is a suppression of true freedom." As Cardozo later summarized
it, liberty must be viewed not merely "negatively or selfishly as a mere absence of
restraint, but positively and socially as an adjustment of restraints to the end of
freedom of opportunity."
...The concept of positive liberty is easily arrived at by considering the
plight of an employee whose only "choice" is between working the hours the
employer demands or not working at all. Such a choice strikes us, intuitively, as
no choice at all. Upon reasoned reflection, we are able to give rational expression
to this intuitive response by means of the concept of positive liberty. Only by
remaining open to the entreaties of reason and passion, of logic and of
experience, can a judge come to understand the complex human meaning of a
rich term such as "liberty," and only with such understanding can courts fulfill
their constitutional responsibility to protect that value.
Brennan, Reason and Passion, supra note 11, at 10-11 (footnotes omitted). On the difference of
negative and positive liberty, see Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in THE IDEA OF
FREEDOM 175 (A. Ryan ed. 1979).
34. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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In addition to the pivotal role of education in sustaining our
political and cultural heritage, denial of education to some isolated
group of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal
Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers present-
ing unreasonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individ-
ual merit. Paradoxically, by depriving the children of any
disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the means by which
that group might raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the
majority. But more directly, "education prepares individuals to be
self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society." Illiteracy is
an enduring disability. The inability to read and write will handi-
cap the individual deprived of a basic education each and every day
of his life. The inestimable toll of that deprivation on the social,
economic, intellectual and psychological well-being of the individ-
ual, and the obstacle it poses to individual achievement, make it
most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of a status-based
denial of basic education with the framework of equality embodied
in the Equal Protection Clause.35
The cloud on the rule of law is fed by manifestly unjust condi-
tions. Justice Brennan strains the logic of prevailing doctrinal reason-
ing in order to accommodate the overcoming of injustice. This
prevailing logic is chosen, and thus itself a form of status- or dis-
course-based denial of accountability to equality. The self-congratula-
tory assumption that law is above social conditions is the result of
both doctrine and training.
II. THE CASE
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.36 involved a white general
contractor's challenge to the constitutionality of a city ordinance
requiring all prime contractors awarded construction contracts by the
city to set aside at least thirty percent of the contract's dollar amount
for minority-owned businesses.37 From the Supreme Court's perspec-
tive, the reason for granting certiorari involved the need to reconcile
two past cases:38 Fullilove v. Klutznick,39 under which federal courts
deferred to congressional findings and remedies of past social discrim-
ination by race in federal construction contracts, and Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education,40 which mandated stricter scrutiny of
35. Id. at 218-22 (citations and footnotes omitted).
36. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
37. Id. at 712-16.
38. Id. at 712, 717-20.
39. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
40. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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intentional discrimination caused by government officials of state and
local governments as a predicate to relief of the effects of past discrim-
ination through racial quotas. Justice O'Connor, delivering the opin-
ion of the Court in City of Richmond,41 left no doubt that the stakes in
deciding the form of judicial review of government action under equal
protection analysis inhered in the relation of law to social justice:
To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone
can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open
the door to competing claims for "remedial relief" for every disad-
vantaged group. The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a soci-
ety where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and
achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based
on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs .... We think
such a result would be contrary to both the letter and spirit of a
constitutional provision whose central command is equality.42
Equality of opportunity, however, represents only one aspect of
social justice and of equality more specifically. As Jean-Jacques
Rousseau enjoined: "It is precisely because the force of things always
tends to destroy equality, that the force of legislation must tend to
maintain it."43 Similarly, Justice Brennan believes: "[T]he equality
principle of our Constitution facilitates important social and eco-
nomic change. It acts as the springboard for the realignment of une-
qual political forces toward economic and social equality."" To the
contrary, Justice O'Connor's formal equality rests on an accompany-
ing view of human nature that citizens are equally independent and
self-interested. Whether such independent individuals are equally
41. The City of Richmond Court could not reach unanimous agreement:
O'CONNOR, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the
opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, III-B, and IV, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, an
opinion with respect to Part II, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, J.,
joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-A and V, in which
REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J.,
and KENNEDY, J., filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
which BRENNAN, J., joined.
Id. at 712. For purposes of this Essay, Justice O'Connor's reasoning will be referred to as the
majority opinion.
42. Id. at 727.
43. See Katz, supra note 24, at 751 (quoting J.J. ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL 220
(Paris 1957)).
44. Brennan, Equality Principle, supra note 11, at 921. Brennan wrote: "The judicial
pursuit of equality is, in my view, properly regarded as the noblest mission of judges: it has
been our central constitutional concern since the repudiation of economic substantive due
process." Id.; see also supra note 24.
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empowered by condition and context, or indeed whether existing
capacities to compete seem important to those who make choices
within given historical circumstances, becomes a subordinated,
because assumed, part of the doctrinal discourse. Justice O'Connor
treats this assumed independent human nature, and the corollaries for
social justice comfortable to it, as neutral and not in need of examina-
tion when translated into standards of judicial review of conduct:
As this Court has noted in the past, the "rights created by the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed
to the individual. The rights established are personal rights."...
To whatever racial group these citizens belong, their "personal
rights" to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated
by a rigid rule erecting race as the sole criterion in an aspect of
public decision making.
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for
such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining
what classifications are "benign" or "remedial" and what classifi-
cations are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferi-
ority or simple racial politics.45
The idea of social justice articulated in this discourse over equal-.
ity and its preservation is not natural or uncontested except by
assumption.46 The examination undertaken here will not address
whether the decision was correct in its doctrinal result. Only the
images and inner logic of the writing are at issue. As a first dependent
variable, the level and form of judicial scrutiny means little in isola-
tion. The second dependent variable in the doctrinal discourse defines
why and in what respect legal motivations and classifications comport
with what equal protection assumes.4 Although, what is offered in
45. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 721 (quoting Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
46. See Peller, supra note 9, at 1175-76.
47. On the relation between the voluntary remedy of social discrimination and equal
protection, see Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100
HARV. L. REV. 78 (1986). Sullivan argues:
[T]he Court has approved affirmative action only as precise penance for the
specific sins of racism a government, union, or employer has committed in the
past. Not surprisingly, this approach has invited claims, such as the Solicitor
General's last Term, that nonsinners-white workers "innocent" of their bosses'
or union leadership's past discrimination-should not pay for "the sins of others
of their own race," nor should nonvictims benefit from their sacrifice. The Court
has never answered these claims from within a sin-based paradigm, as it might
have either by viewing the category of black "victims" of past discrimination
expansively, or by discounting claims of white "innocence." But neither has the
Court ever broken out of sin-based rationales to elaborate a paradigm that would
look forward rather than back, justifying affirmative action as the architecture of
a racially integrated future.
Id. at 80 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 530 n.12 (1980)).
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the one hand-a predicate of wrong to an enforceable notion of equal-
ity-is taken back by the other hand-a strict scrutiny of any form of
passive or active racial intent in the chosen remedy. Further, the logic
of exclusion embodied in Justice O'Connor's reasoning is not obvious
from within its own definition of reasonableness.48 The more subtle
exclusion occurs by what is taken for granted in constructing the
terms of the legal dispute. Justice O'Connor defines justice as equal-
ity, positively, on its own terms, in the abstract. Curiously, positive
definitions exclude what they do not affirm, especially when bounded
by negative restraints called rights. However, to establish equality
more than abstractly or formally, justice can only be known by a dif-
ferent negative, that is, by overcoming injustice. Yet, for Justice
O'Connor the connection of law, and therefore the state, with social
practices of race is one that is manageable, in fact legally cognizable,
only as a matter of the intentions of public individuals.49 It is by
intent that positive, abstract lines are crossed. To outline this system
of assumptions: Drawing the relationship between public and private
power as one of actions by agents reduces the content of the state to
that of government decisions, limits rights to rights against decisions
made by identifiable individuals employed by government, and limits
law to either the opposite or the consequence of legislated politics.
48. Indeed, Justice O'Connor softens the logical rigor of her assumptions defining intent,
provoking two more extreme statements in the concurring opinions of Justices Kennedy and
Scalia, both of whom rely upon an even more abstract notion of equality as formal
opportunity. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 734-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment), 735-39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Equality is
satisfied by mere facial governmental color-blindness. Id. Sullivan argues the search for
doctrinal formality substantially limits the idea of voluntary remedy of discrimination:
Visiting affimative duties to integrate only upon past wrongdoers also makes
racial preferences seem more like corrective or retributive justice than like social
engineering. It thus helps to rebut charges that racial balancing has become an
end in itself. If just any employer were free to become an avenging angel, using
affirmative action to right a diffuse and generalized history of racism in society at
large, the racial composition resulting in that employer's workplace might appear
arbitrary. But if the employer discriminated in the past, its extension of
preferential treatment to blacks now can be understood as simply creating a
racial balance that might have existed anyway, but for the discrimination.
Making sins of past discrimination the justification for affirmative action,
however, dooms affirmative action to further challenge even while legitimating it.
. . . True, viewing affirmative action that way saves it from the charge that it
aims only at racially balanced results by making it seem instead a matter of
corrective or retributive justice, compensating for or punishing earlier racial
wrongs. But because corrective justice focuses on victims, and retributive justice
on wrongdoers, predicating affirmative action on past sins of discrimination
invites claims that neither nonvictims should benefit, nor nonsinners pay.
Sullivan, supra note 46, at 92.
49. See City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 720, 724, 727 (intent of public officials and public
officials suborning private intent).
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This form of the concept of state depends upon a strong public-
private distinction. Public interest is derivative of private interest
where rights defining the limits of government are exhausted by con-
flict known by the voluntary interactions of one individual with
another. Rights of presocial private interest may be redistributed by
legislative politics consistent with those liberties placed in law beyond
politics. Individuals thus deserve those resources they possess. The
use of property may be redistributed or limited, but the action of pri-
vate use against private use cannot be state action, even if permitted,
or authorized, or made operative by the law.-" Thus, Justice
O'Connor and the Court in City of Richmond reason that since pri-
vate persons are not responsible for the public, which is simply deriva-
tive of aggregated private interest, the public cannot be responsible for
that same primary private interest when discriminatory on any
grounds.5' It does not matter that the discrimination may have been
effective by virtue of economic and political position achieved by the
totality of incentives structured by government involvement in social
relations more generally,52 nor indeed that political and economic
50. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (warehouseman utilizing self-help
distraint provision of the New York Uniform Commercial Code for nonpayment of household
goods stored as result of sheriffs eviction not involved in state action and not subject to due
process clause of fourteenth amendment).
51. Justice O'Connor's view of the nonliability of the public for private discrimination may
be compared with the following view expressed by Justice Brennan:
The greatest formality and regularity of government operation is reflected in
the organization form of the modern state: the bureaucracy. Max Weber, one of
the earliest and most insightful analysts of this phenomenon, described its
characteristic principle as "the abstract regularity of the exercise of authority,"
which is prompted by the desire for " '[e]quality before the law' and the demand
for legal guarantees against arbitrariness." "The theory of modern public
administration," wrote Weber, "assumes that the authority to order certain
matters by decree . . . does not entitle the agency to regulate the matter by
individual commands given for each case, but only to regulate the matter
abstractly." The bureaucratic model of authority therefore aspires ultimately to
banish passion from government altogether, and to establish a state where only
reason will reign. . . . In its starkest form, the ability of bureaucracy to hide
responsibility calls to mind the words that Hannah Arendt wrote of Adolf
Eichmann: "You ... said that your role in the Final Solution was an accident
and that almost anybody could have taken your place .... What you meant to
say was that where all, or almost all, are guilty, nobody is." If due process values
are to be preserved in the bureaucratic state of the late twentieth century, it may
be essential that officials possess passion-the same passion that puts them in
touch with the dreams and disappointments of those with whom they deal.
Brennan, REASON AND PASSION, supra note 11, at 18-19 (footnotes omitted).
52. John Keane describes the ideology of privatization of the state more generally:
A selective withdrawal of state power from civil society and the gradual
renewal of private competition and market ethics are envisaged. The state, in
this view, should be biased more openly in favour of commodity production and
exchange. Neo-conservatives do not normally call for limitations of the power of
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dominance extends unbroken from an origin of enforced slavery. It
does not matter because it cannot matter that personal conduct and
power has mere legal authorization. In short, the ideology of the
empty state, 53 the state empty of all but the decisions of its agents,
renders social discrimination without more, beyond the boundaries of
legal concern and the lawyer's craft:
Justice Powell contrasted the "focused" goal of remedying
"wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination"
with "the remedying of the effects of 'societal discrimination,' an
amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into
the past." He indicated that for the governmental interest in reme-
dying past discrimination to be triggered "judicial, legislative, or
administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations"
must be made.
5 4
What is surprising about Justice O'Connor's opinion is that she
recognizes that the predicate for remedy could be demonstrated by
findings of passive involvement of government officials:
Thus, if the city could show that it had essentially become a "pas-
sive participant" in a system of racial exclusion practiced by ele-
ments of the local construction industry, we think it clear that the
city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system. It is
beyond dispute that any public entity, state or federal, has a com-
pelling interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from the tax
contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of pri-
vate prejudice. 5
Indeed, this passage raises hope among civil rights activists that law
can be used against some past racial discrimination in ways consid-
ered doubtful following Wygant. 6 Justice O'Connor's very attempt
to expand government responsibility to the nod and the wink demon-
the state. State power is seen to be essential as a forum for determining and
administering the rules of market competition, as well as for filling its gaps and
limiting its malfunctions. Thus the main task is to render it more effective and
legitimate by limiting its role as a provider of goods and services to civil society
in favour of its role as the authoritative guardian of civil society. The state must
become both more powerful and more limited in scope.
Keane, supra note 17, at 10-11 (footnotes omitted).
53. On the ideology of the empty state, see Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence-A
First Step by Way of the Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMi L. REV.
379, 412-22 (1983).
54. City of Richmond., 109 S. Ct. at 722-23 (O'Connor, J.) (quoting University of
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)) (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 720.
56. Justice O'Connor thus distinguishes between dismantling a private system of
discrimination which benefits from government privileging and visiting the consequences of
remedying past actions on persons who benefitted from past hiring discrimination but who did
not discriminate themselves. This is a distinction that ignores the role of the legal system as a
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strates first, that the far limits of liberty's possible content are still
hostage to the practicalities of judicial review of intentional conduct,57
and second, that this need for a drawable line is to preserve the sepa-
ration of law from politics, including racial politics. 8
Just because politics cannot infect law, however, does not entail
the consequence that law may not limit the apparent openness of poli-
tics. Formal access to political decisionmaking is not access to the
resources that make participation meaningful. For those from the
outside who have watched Tammany provide all but .67% of Rich-
mond's construction to white contractors over five years,59 it might
seem curious that the very success of the black majority of the city in
gaining a bare majority on the city commission should make it harder
to obtain a fairer distribution of the pie.6'
In his City of Richmond dissent, Justice Marshall laments the
shifting rules of the game:
In concluding that remedial classifications warrant no differ-
ent standard of review under the Constitution than the most brute
and repugnant forms of state-sponsored racism, a majority of this
Court signals that it regards racial discrimination as largely a phe-
nomenon of the past, and that government bodies need no longer
preoccupy themselves with rectifying racial injustice. I, however,
do not believe this Nation is anywhere close to eradicating racial
whole in organizing the market behavior that visits the misreading of market decisions by
businesses on employees.
57. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 723. Justice O'Connor stated: "Like the 'role model'
theory employed in Wygant, a generalized asssertion that there has been past discrimination in
an entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of
the injury it seeks to remedy." Id.
58. Peller describes this ideology:
[1]t is necessary to resist the image of social relations as simple products of
individual intent and choice. Rather, we must recognize and articulate the social
and external aspects inherent in so-called private relations. The image of private
social relations and "individual" choice depends on the metaphysic of presence.
"Private" relations are "private" to the extent that they are represented as not
constituted or influenced by "absent" public or social forces; "individual will" is
"individual" to the extent that it is self-present and not dependent on the
practices of others. The metaphysic of privacy and self-presence accordingly
denies the politics of the social construction of the self and the other by finding
the origin of the relation in a source for social practices existing prior to social
practices, in a mythical moment of purity from the public world.
Peller, supra note 9, at 1178.
59. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 714.
60. Id. at 722. Justice Stevens stated however: "There is, of course, another possibility
that should not be overlooked. The ordinance might be nothing more than a form of
patronage. But racial patronage, like a racial gerrymander, is no more defensible than political
patronage or a political gerrymander." Id. at 733 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and




discrimination or its vestiges. . . . I am also troubled by the major-
ity's assertion that, even if it did not believe generally in strict scru-
tiny of race-based remedial measures, "the circumstances of this
case" require this Court to look upon the Richmond City Council's
measure with the strictest scrutiny. The sole such circumstance
which the majority cites, however, is the fact that blacks in Rich-
mond are a "dominant racial grou[p]" in the city....
In my view, the "circumstances of this case," underscore the
importance of not subjecting to a strict scrutiny straitjacket the
increasing number of cities which have recently come under minor-
ity leadership and are eager to rectify, or at least prevent the per-
petuation of, past racial discrimination. In many cases, these cities
will be the ones with the most in the way of prior discrimination to
rectify. Richmond's leaders had just witnessed decades of publicly
sanctioned racial discrimination in virtually all walks of life--dis-
crimination amply documented in the decisions of the federal
judiciary.6 1
But, Justice O'Connor insists, remedy of past discrimination requires
consistency with equal protection of the laws if it is to be understood
as more than racially motivated political redistribution. Under the
ideology of the empty state,62 what renders the fact of redistribution
"non-neutral" is fault-an intention that is either direct, Wygant, or
passive, City of Richmond. Simply to hold government aloof from
private practices enforced by legal rules is not state action. As gov-
ernment actors have done nothing, the state has done nothing. As
there is no affirmative legal obligation to change social practice, the
state has done nothing except continue the social order. That many of
the existing contractors might not have survived to the present with-
out past state support and state supervision of the marketplace is not
the responsibility of the state until a government official intends to
wink for the benefit of the state. Justice Marshall counters:
When government channels all its contracting funds to a white-
dominated community of established contractors whose racial
homogeneity is the product of private discrimination, it does more
than place its imprimatur on the practices which forged and which
continue to define that community. It also provides a measurable
boost to those economic entities that have thrived within it, while
61. Id. at 752-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Marshall noted
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (annexation denying right to vote based on
race); Bradley v. School Board of Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 412 U.S. 92
(1973) (inadequate compliance with Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and
relating housing discrimination to desegration of schools).
62. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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denying important economic benefits to those entities which, but
for prior discrimination, might well be better qualified to receive
valuable government contracts.63
Apparently, under the majority's logic, a pattern of contracting
without set-asides in which only .67% of city resources went to white
contractors would be acceptable. But then again no, because a state's
passive intent to discriminate can be demonstrated by large statistical
disparity between the ratio of contract awards and the preexisting per-
centage of white contractors, many of whom benefitted by past "neu-
tral" patterns of awards.' Of course, the real issue is not whether to
approve distribution of public largesse by race, but rather the empty
formalism of limiting the remedy of racial discrimination's conse-
quences to the consequences of past and present intentional conduct,
under the illusion that this exhausts the responsibility of the law.
Many conceptual lines short of blanket approval of discrimination by
blacks in government against whites seem possible.65
It is possible to agree with all the criteria employed by Justice
O'Connor to ensure that a race conscious remedy be narrowly tai-
lored in order to justify sufficient government interest in using racial
determination of any government action, without either assuming
that only formal theories of equality define equal protection or
demanding strict scrutiny of all uses of race. Indeed, it is possible to
disfavor racial quotas until the final resort. Rather, the focus should
be about how to understand the causes of racial disparity within the
history of the community. 66 If doctrine permitted affirmative govern-
mental support to change social patterns of injustice, then even the
standards of Justice Stevens' concurrence may be acceptable-that is,
putting historically disfavored "contractors" of the state under the
constraint of market discipline in the prices that they can charge con-
sistent with remedial set-asides.67 To demand, however, that localities
show qualified minorities have already overcome barriers to entry in
63. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 744 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Justice O'Connor stated:
There is no doubt that "[wihere gross statistical disparities can be shown, they
alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of
discrimination" under Title VII. But it is equally clear that "[w]hen special
qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general
population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the
necessary qualifications) may have little probative value."
Id. at 725 (citations omitted).
65. See Sullivan, supra note 46.
66. See the much more realistic approach of Justice Stevens. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct.
at 730-34 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. at 729.
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order to decide whether they are still overly underrepresented ignores
that in the modern welfare state we are all "contractors" of the state.
Ironically, Justice O'Connor concludes with a call for strict scru-
tiny even in reviewing voluntary race discrimination remedies that are
defined as measures "taken in the service of the goal of equality
itself."'6 8 Responsibility for the consequences of public power, how-
ever, should not cease merely because a triggerman cannot be identi-
fied in situations when public power organizes the game itself as a
pattern of acceptable social practice. Just as economic justice is with-
held by excluding alien school children under Plyler v. Doe,6 9 in the
same way, it is rendered more difficult by allowing exclusion of black
contractors under City of Richmond in the name of including more
white contractors. Acceptance of law as an arena for social conflict
and social organization makes what the state allows, whether by
intention or avoidance, equally a part of law. The state encompasses
all official articulations and constructions of legitimated power. Law
is a barrier to a more just society whenever justice depends on social
conditions, and social conditions depend largely on the political con-
struction of legalized practices. Otherwise the liberty constructed is
the liberty of the status quo.7" Again, ironically: "Business as usual
should not mean business pursuant to the unthinking exclusion of cer-
tain members of our society from its rewards."7 There is no neutral,
no ahistorical place, from which to work out fairness.
III. THE REPORT
The Special Committee of the Association of American Law
68. Id. at 730.
69. 457 U.S. 202 (1982); see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
70. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (failure to demonstrate causation in fact
relation of remedy to exclusion in challenge to segregative consequences of zoning) with
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (causation in fact demonstrated
in relation of remedy to challenge in destabilizing integrated community by red-lining). In
these two cases, both dealing with the requirements for standing in federal courts, the Supreme
Court reached opposite results, although the relevant considerations for determination of
standing-facts, pleadings, statutory rights, proof of intent, and relief requested-were
materially identical. Even though effective relief depends upon the intentional acts of third
parties in both cases, this apparent anomaly in access to adjudication is easily understood
within the conceptual framework of the empty state: The plaintiff in Warth, seeking to modify
the status quo, does not get past the courthouse door, but the plaintiff in Gladstone, seeking to
preserve the status quo, is permitted to bring suit. See also Casebeer, supra note 53, at 393-423.
71. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 730. Compare Justice O'Connor's statement with the
editorial comment of Charles Krauthammer, quoting Henry Marsh, a black city councilman
and former mayor of Richmond: " 'The Supreme Court used to be the first place to which we
turned.' It is now the last and there is nowhere else to turn. Richmond v. Croson marks the
beginning of the end of affirmative action." Krauthammer, Exit Affirmative Action,
Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1989, at A25, col. 5.
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Schools (AALS) 2 was charged with evaluating "whether the AALS
should take a leadership role in the development of a Statement of
ethical and professional responsibilities of law professors. '7 3 In the
introduction to the report, the Special Committee expressly links the
role of law professors with social justice as the basis of professional
ethics:
This general aspiration--easier to state than accomplish-
cannot be achieved by edict, for moral integrity and unselfish dedi-
cation to the welfare of others cannot be legislated. Nevertheless, a
public statement of general principles of ethical and professional
responsibility can provide guidance for newcomers and a reminder
for experienced teachers about the basic ethical and professional
tenets-the ethos-of their profession.
74
Some of the Draft Report's specific aspirations are straightfor-
wardly commendable, such as its strong stand against stereotyping
and bias on grounds of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, sex-
ual orientation, age or political beliefs.7 5 Defenses of academic free-
dom and the right to equal and pluralistic support of research and
ideas76 seemingly provide positive reasons for professors to embrace
the code. Even those sections suggesting limitations on professorial
freedom or creating obligations to students, 77 colleagues,78 bar and
public, 79 stated as aspirations, can seem restrained. This is precisely
the problem.8" The document touted as a statement of aspirations, on
72. Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors, supra note 4.
73. AALS cover letter transmitting the Draft Report of the Special Committee on the
Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors (copy on file with the University of
Miami Law Review).
74. Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors, supra note 4, at 2.
75. Id. at 6.
76. Id. at 8-10.
77. Id. at 4-7.
78. Id. at 11-13.
79. Id. at 16-17.
80. See Peller, supra note 8, at 1157-58. Peller wrote:
Think, for example, of the fork rules at a formal dinner party. The rules of
etiquette are one of the myriad ways that the social relations at the dinner party
are structured. They are part of the web of various cultural codes, which include
diction, dress, permissible topics of conversation, etc., that constitute the group
as a particular set of social relations and that distinguish the group from other
groups which follow different codes and structures. But these rules are not
"merely" social conventions. They also mediate the relations between guests at
the dinner party as invisible distancing devices, so that in some sense when the
guests speak, they are not simply speaking as individuals to one another. In
addition, the cultural group or the professional class also speaks as the guests
reproduce the characteristics of the group through their obedience to the cultural
codes.
The cultural codes demarcate roles for the group members. These roles
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closer examination, largely lists weak negative statements of restraint.
The stand on sexual harassment" takes several sentences to caution:
consent is at risk in hierarchical situations, perceptions are important,
so let's be careful out there. As statements of minimal aspirations, the
Draft Report can make professors look foolish and insincere. The
"aspirations" make more sense viewed as negotiated compromises on
standards of discipline. In fact, the introduction to those aspirations
reads somewhat differently:
Although the norms of conduct set forth in this statement may be
relevant when questions concerning the propriety of conduct arise
in a particular institutional context, the statement is not promul-
gated as a disciplinary code. Rather, the primary purpose of the
statement-couched for the most part in general and aspirational
terms-is to provide guidance to law professors . "..."82
Nonaspirational invitations to discipline most easily fit aspirations
defined as restraints.
Negative restraints even in the pursuit of positive values are,
moreover, not positive aspirations. At the first meeting of the Ameri-
can Association of University Professors (AAUP) in 1915, President
John Dewey "proclaimed that one of the Association's priorities
would be the development of 'professional standards, standards which
will be quite as scrupulous regarding the obligations imposed by free-
dom as jealous of the freedom itself.' "83 In its "Statement on Profes-
sional Ethics,"'8 4 adopted in April 1966, the AAUP reached two
conclusions: first, disiplinary codes were a task for local institutions
through their faculty; 5 second, the AAUP should truly shape positive
seem to limit the scope of members' possible relations as they express the self-
understanding of the social class. ("We party this way and not that way.") But
to each of the group members, the cultural codes do not exist as expressions of
themselves. The codes are simply "just the way things are" in the group
experience. The structure of group relations takes on a life of its own as each of
the group members merely steps into the roles as a way to be within the group.
The contingency and exclusivity of the conventions would be apparent to anyone
from a different social group. To group members, however, the conventions
become invisible mediators of their relations. The cultural codes give social
actions a meaning distinct from any particular intent of the participants.
Id.
81. Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors, supra note 4, at 6-7.
82. Id. at 2-3.
83. American Association of University Professors, Statement on Professional Ethics,
AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 131 (1984) [hereinafter Statement on Professional
Ethics].
84. Id. at 133.
85. The statement on Professional Ethics reads in relevant part:
In the enforcement of ethical standards, the academic profession differs from
those of law and medicine, whose associations act to assure the integrity of
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aspirations that give an operational meaning to academic freedom. 6
Compare the first aspirational statement of the AAUP to the largely
negative content of the AALS's Draft Report on academic freedom. 7
The AAUP's Statement begins:
I. The professor, guided by a deep conviction of the worth
and dignity of the advancement of knowledge, recognizes the spe-
cial responsibilities placed upon him. His primary responsibility to
his subject is to seek and to state the truth as he sees it. To this end
he devotes his energies to developing and improving his scholarly
competence. He accepts the obligation to exercise critical self-dis-
cipline and judgment in using, extending, and transmitting knowl-
ege. He practices intellectual honesty. Although he may follow
subsidiary interests, these interests must never seriously hamper or
compromise his freedom of inquiry."
members engaged in private practice. In the academic profession the individual
institution of higher learning provides this assurance and so should normally
handle questions concerning propriety of conduct within its own framework by
reference to a faculty group.
Id.
86. Id.
87. Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors, supra note 4, at 4-5.
88. Statement on Professional Ethics, supra note 83, at 133. The remainder of the
Statement on Professional Ethics reads:
II. As a teacher, the professor encourages the free pursuit of learning in his
students. He holds before them the best scholarly standards of his discipline. He
demonstrates respect for the student as an individual, and adheres to his proper
role as intellectual guide and counselor. He makes every reasonable effort to
foster honest academic conduct and to assure that his evaluation of students
reflects their true merit. He respects the confidential nature of the relationship
between professor and student. He avoids any exploitation of students for his
private advantage and acknowledges significant assistance from them. He
protects their academic freedom.
III. As a colleague, the professor has obligations that derive from common
membership in the community of scholars. He respects and defends the free
inquiry of his associates. In the exchange of criticism and ideas he shows due
respect for the opinions of others. He acknowledges his academic debts and
strives to be objective in his professional judgment of colleagues. He accepts his
share of faculty responsibilities for the governance of his institution.
IV. As a member of his institution, the professor seeks above all to be an
effective teacher and scholar. Although he observes the stated regulations of the
institution, provided they do not contravene academic freedom, he maintains his
right to criticize and seek revision. He determines the amount and character of
the work he does outside his institution with due regard to his paramount
responsibilities within it. When considering the interruption or termination of
his service, he recognizes the effect of his decision upon the program of the
institution and gives due notice of his intentions.
V. As a member of his community, the professor has the rights and
obligations of any citizen. He measures the urgency of these obligations in the
light of his responsibilities to his subject, to his students, to his profession, and to
his institution. When he speaks or acts as a private person he avoids creating the
impression that he speaks or acts for his college or university. As a citizen
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Even conceding disciplinary standards defined by reasonably
drawn responsibilities, conceptual lines are still drawn in such stan-
dards from which inferences of acceptable and unacceptable conduct
structure situations of problematic choices. In the AALS draft
report, one of the strongest "should nots" appears as the second
responsibility defined in the first section, "Responsibilities to
Students":
[S]tudents, as well as teachers, are entitled to exercise the funda-
mental right of intellectual freedom. While honest exchanges of
views about the nature of law and appropriate legal principles may
reveal the political views of both student and teacher, a professor
should not use the classroom to indoctrinate students concerning
his or her political or social agenda.89
This AALS negative "aspiration" to avoid indoctrination can be used
disciplinarily to contradict the very heart of the AAUP positive aspi-
ration of academic freedom:
Continuing attacks on the integrity of our universities and on the
concept of academic freedom itself come from many quarters.
These attacks, marked by tactics of intimidation and harassment
and by political interference with the autonomy of colleges and
universities, provoke harsh responses and counterresponses. Espe-
cially in a repressive atmosphere, the faculty's responsibility to
defend its freedoms cannot be separated from its responsibility to
uphold those freedoms by its own actions.9°
What purpose does differentiating doctrine and indoctrination
serve? Taken literally, a substantial percentage of each law school's
curriculum would contradict this ethos of a nonideological construc-
engaged in a profession that depends upon freedom for its health and integrity,
the professor has a particular obligation to promote conditions of free inquiry
and to further public understanding of academic freedom.
Id. at 133-34.
89. Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors, supra note 4, at 4-5.
90. American Association of University Professors, A Statement of the Association's
Council: Freedom and Responsibility, AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 135, 135
(1984). The AAUP handles the issue of student freedom in a positive way:
Free inquiry and free expression are indispensable to the attainment of these
goals. As members of the academic community, students should be encouraged
to develop the capacity for critical judgment and to engage in a sustained and
independent search for truth. Institutional procedures for achieving these
purposes may vary from campus to campus, but the minimal standards of
academic freedom of students outlined below are essential to any community of
scholars.
Freedom to teach and freedom to learn are inseparable facets of academic
freedom.
American Association of University Professors, Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of
Students, AAUP POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 141, 141 (1984).
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tion of legal theory. Almost all so-called "private law" courses, and
their skills analogues of negotiation and drafting, involve the opera-
tion of complex legal forms and fictions as an integral part of social
organization itself. Not just any social system is contemplated- cor-
porations, capital markets, goods markets and labor markets either
exist directly as legal creations or are substantially structured and
maintained by legal actions. The meanings taken for granted in their
articulation and understanding are those appropriate to the reproduc-
tion of a particular form of social organization, the Capitalist-Welfare
State.9 To teach a competent corporate finance or corporate organi-
zation course requires teaching this ideology. Thus, what the AALS
must mean when it directs that "a professor should not use the class-
room to indoctrinate students concerning his or her political or social
agenda"92 is that there is good ideology and bad ideology. Good ide-
ology is that which assumes the present role of law necessary to the
working of existing institutions.93 This law includes assumptions of
what about those institutions is no longer challengeable. If law is neu-
tral, faculty should be neutral when they are teaching. Their criti-
cisms of law are first, personal, and second, appropriately channeled
into law reform, pro bono expansion of legal services, or legislative
change of legal rules. Not surprisingly, the Special Committee affirms
the right of faculty members to hold personal political beliefs and to
identify them in class at least for credibility's sake.94 The Special
Committee even includes a mandatory pro bono requirement.95 Like
all public-private distinctions based on the moral autonomy of indi-
viduals, the content of the public must be cast as neutral to the per-
sonal interest. In return, the personal interest must not threaten the
public's neutrality.96 It is this meta-assumption of neutrality that
explains a later section prohibiting the formation of voting alliances
that would affect faculty decisions on the content of legal curricula or
faculty appointments.97
While there may be many valid reasons, such as mutuality in
nurturing fragile experiments in ideas, to eschew party politics within
law schools or the academy more generally, none of them can be
91. On the relationship of social incentives to social organization, see J. COHEN & J.
ROGERS, ON DEMOCRACY (1983).
92. Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors, supra note 4, at 5.
93. Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387 (198 1) (rejecting the apparent neutrality of cost-benefit toward personal preferences).
94. Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors, supra note 4, at 4-5.
95. Id. at 7.
96. On the antinomy of the individual and the community, see Kennedy, The Structure of
Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 209, 209-21 (1979).
97. Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors, supra note 4, at 1I.
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based on any credible belief that professing law is neutral. Faculties
vote on appointments; they vote on curriculum and other matters. As
any devotee of the "Chicago School" knows, it is disingenuous to call
these decisions apolitical. What the Special Committee undoubtedly
means is that "private," personal politics have no place, because these
faculty decisions are political only in the sense of the good ideology.
9 8
This dichotomy carries two unstated assumptions. First, that the line
between personal politics and professional or educational interests in
social justice can be articulated.99 Second, that this articulation
depends upon the neutrality of what content is thereby expressed. In
the same manner, law is separate from politics in which social justice
is defined on legal terms consistent with existing distributional mecha-
nisms. This is of course precisely what Justice O'Connor intended in
City of Richmond, and precisely the professionalized ideology of the
empty state.'°°
That law is neutral has been challenged by a formidable percent-
age of law professors since the advent of legal realism. 10 1 There is
thus an alternative to exclusionary neutrality in both education and
legal doctrine-inclusion. Law schools can admit the inescapably
political nature of legal practice and seek to serve it by diversification
of various points of social justice within faculties and curricula.
Courts can admit the doctrinal lines they draw are artificial and need
justification. 0 2 When justification cannot embrace all affected parties,
the decision can aim to reinforce and legitimate institutional practices
of inclusion and interdependence. Overcoming injustice vindicates
realism more than theoretical constructions of justice that exclude. In
some instances, like remedy of past social conflict defined by unfair
terms of dependence, now pursued under conditions of present social
interdependence, courts may be able to do little more than ensure that
all sides of a painful reconstruction process are participants in the
98. For a discussion of the assertion of the neutrality of legal education as a profession, see
the dispute generated by Dean Carrington in "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and
Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985).
99. For an alternative vision of professional responsibility, which suggests the difference
between an ethics of rational accountability under neutral standards versus an ethics of
personal character in response to constructed social contexts, see Rosen, Ethical Soap. L.A.
Law and the Privileging of Character, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1229 (1989).
100. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
101. See generally Llewellyn, The Normative, The Legal, and The Law Jobs." The Problem of
Juristic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1335 (1940) (law and legal actors are not neutral). The
conjunction of Karl Llewellyn on legal substance and John Dewey on professional ethics is not
coincidental. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
102. See Casebeer, The Judging Glass, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 59 (1978) (inherent politics of
judicial decisionmaking as a legacy of realism).
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terms of the remedy. 103 This does not suggest formal equality on the
one hand, or that more can be done than institutionalize social con-
flict over distribution of social resources on the other. Given the ideo-
logical function of law, imbrication of interest and conflict in law will
occur regardless of judicial articulations."° When power is articu-
lated and constructed by and through the agency of law, liberty is
either a permission and a dependency, or a joint enterprise and an
expression of mutuality. The real question is whether disputes will be
treated with historical integrity or swept under a rug of false con-
sciousness, a consciousness that may then only reappear in social
unrest and alienation. What should be clear is that without changing
injustice, alienation cannot be treated with integrity. Without integ-
rity measured in real terms for those affected, the function of mediat-
ing social conflict will suffer, and the autonomy of legal practice will
be challenged again. The reconstruction of legal discourse can at least
respond to such pragmatic openings to democracy.'
At stake for legal education is a contest over the meaning of
social justice in law, rooted in a conception of law training.106 The
assumption of the Special Committee of the AALS 107 must be that the
goal of legal training is the facilitation of social transactions and the
representation of interest in civil or criminal institutional contexts.
As more and more lawyers' time, as a percentage of all legal services,
is purchased by large institutions serving a minute percentage of the
103. This suggestion is not the same-as Dean Ely's representation reinforcement extension
of Caroline Products. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Protection of discrete
and insular minorities and the fairness of process still assumes presocial individual interests
can be aggregated in some formally fair way, at least in approximation. It therefore assumes in
common with social wealth maximization that the conditions and distributions giving rise to
present interests are not themselves subject to legal challenge. Dean Ely does agree, however,
with deferential scrutiny of remedies volunteered by white majorities. See Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 727 (1974). Compare
Ely's view with that of Heller. See Heller, On Formal Democracy, in CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE
STATE 129 (J. Keane ed. 1988).
104. See Peller, supra note 9, at 1290. Peller wrote:
[T]he task is to face the inevitability of politics in its fullest sense . . . . We
inevitably align with one group or another; there is no place free from the play of
social practice, where we could flee from the existential condition that we create
our world on the basis of a prior context that we can never fully grasp.
Id.
105. For an alternative basis of legal meaning and its relation to social organization based
on the dependence of democracy on equality, see Casebeer, Work on a Labor Theory of
Meaning, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1637 (1989).
106. See Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984); Simon,
The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WiS. L. REV. 30
(1978).
107. Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors, supra note 4.
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population,10 8 and as even in the criminal trial context and certainly
in civil litigation, the name of the game is settlement or negotiation in
the shadow of law, this assumption about legal education may be a
,self-fulfilling prophecy.
There is, however, another traditional, more inclusive, model of
the basic legal skill and the basic legal operation. The legal skill is
the, in-principle justifiable, strategic presentation and articulation of
law and legal norms. The legal operation is the resolution of social
conflicts through the contested articulation of standards of justice.
Lawyers just do not do much of the latter anymore unless it is as
poorly read social welfare maximizers. In short, what we often decide
inside law schools in the name of surface disputes about opening up
skill training, or about "public" versus "private" courses as percent-
ages of the curriculum, is on what terms the social institutions being
constructed need to be designed to include actual political and moral
participation as part of everyday life, and in what form and quantity
will courses suggest that democratic practices are appropriate deci-
sionmaking concerns of prospective lawyers. Often in legal discourse,
individuals make their appearances as modelled proxies of efficiency
or reasonableness. Actual preferences and interests are unnecessary
to know if the market tells decisionmakers all they need to know
about whatever real people by definition must want regardless of what
those people might say themselves.0 9 Of course, once lawyer's justice
is purely market derivative, a social welfare maximizer might ask why
we need lawyers in the loop at all, as it appears much of the lawyer's
livelihood can be taken over by "others."" 0 Access to transactions
and capital is not as a matter of logic necessarily the same as access to
social justice. The AALSII draws a fictitious legal line between law
108. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 2, at 983. Justice Brennan stated:
"Steadily," Justice Stone said, "the best skill and capacity of the profession has
been drawn into the exacting and highly specialized service of business and
finance" with the consequence that "[a]t its worst it has made the learned
profession of an earlier day the obsequious servant of business and tainted it with
the morals and manners of the market place in its most anti-social
manifestations."
Id. (quoting Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1934)).
109. The argument that, in legal discourse, individuals appear as modelled proxies of
efficiency or reasonableness is not new. See R. HALE, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW: PUBLIC
CONTROL OF PRIVATE GOVERNING POWER (1952); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935).
110. On the fragmentation of legal services and markets following the privatization of law,
see the current government proposals of the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom:
The Work and Organization of the Legal Profession, 1988, Cmnd 570; Conveyance by
Authorized Practitioners, 1988, Cmnd 571; Contigency Fees, 1988, Cmnd 571 (The Mackay
Green Papers), summarized in 139 NEW L.J. 147 (1989).
111. Ethical and Professional Responsibilities of Law Professors, supra note 4.
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and politics that it cannot maintain within its chosen ethics except by
choosing itself as an ideology.
IV. THE NON-TEXT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE
Each of the texts 112 are perfectly normal and in many ways laud-
able expressions of healthy social institutions, engaged in the func-
tional reproduction of their role in our society. That's just the point.
The very normality of justices encouraging law students to include
social responsibility in their publicly charged, quasi-official profession;
of Supreme Court opinions striking a balance between perceived
extreme readings of conflicting past doctrine; of cross-disciplinary
professions seeking to establish a professional identity and social role
through the promulgation of aspirational ethics establishes the condi-
tions of what is natural, or what is taken as naturally appropriate to
our society. The rational incentives of market organization of social
relations correlate symbiotically with legal reasoning because econ-
omy and law are known by their interpenetration." 3 The natural fit
of the normal operation of legal institutions to the understanding of
what is included in the law creates lenses of social experience whether
used by prospective lawyers, present judges, or legal educators. What
judges assume to be law, and how teachers and students learn the
social functionality of law, depends on what law can cognize. The
articulation of legitimate power as the power naturally appropriate to
existing institutions makes access to the making of the social condi-
tions that are the functional contexts for existing institutions crucial
to social justice. Thus the key to a credible articulation of social jus-
tice includes access to power established by social conditions as part
of access to the legal system's power to legitimate those conditions.
Justice Brennan's brilliance in his Cole Lecture consists in recogniz-
ing that the exclusion of the socially disadvantaged can be both by
exclusion from the profession and by exclusion from the profession's
consciousness as represented in its agenda and responsibility. But
beyond participation in the ideals of law, Brennan recognizes that
exclusion extends beyond the political representation of minorities in
judgeships to the definition of the subjects, methods, and assumptions
of legal doctrine and legal enforcement, and therefore, to the distribu-
tion of social resources resulting from the articulation of the legalized
112. See supra notes 2, 3 & 4 and accompanying text.
113. "(A theoretical framework that views the form of law as necessarily an expression of
the capitalist economic system] invites us to analyse the real effects of legal relations as
constitutive elements of social relations whilst at the same time being able to grasp the real
roots of 'legality' (rights, liberties, rule of law, due process, etc.) which are in turn a condition
of the effectivity of law." Fryer, supra note 28, at 14.
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practices of social behavior. But beyond participation in both the ide-
als and the ideas of law, Brennan recognizes that exclusion begins in
the cramped style of what is taken for granted. What is not law but
rather politics is up for grabs in part because it cannot be taken for
granted. The separation of law from politics is the politics of business
as usual. It is the politics of the empty state. It produces the liberty
of the status quo. The trouble is that at some point those excluded
from a voice, representation, ideas, and resources simply believe that
the relegation of politics from law relegates the law from the
excluded. It is denial of participation in the practices and the rule of
law that ties together the twin alienation of the socially disadvantaged
from both the law and the legal system.
These are understandings that neither the majority of the
Supreme Court in City of Richmond nor the AALS Special Commit-
tee can recognize. The problem is not that either represents extreme
or malevolent exclusions. Their blinders are reasonable to the social
task from within their own frameworks. It is because Justice
O'Connor does not understand the relationship of the construction of
law to social conditions that societal discrimination is less legally rele-
vant than the public or private actor's intentionality. It is because the
AALS does not see that ideology is the point of present legal doctrine
that it can treat deviation from practice as excludable ideology and
reject any politicization explaining the existing pattern of political
occupancy of law faculties. Social justice is lived on terms the law
allows. For the current courts and profession, after all, that may be
the primary function of law: to allow. But allowance that is more
than a false hope demands participation, judged by its results in social
conditions and in the articulable understanding of those conditions in
social ideas. Ultimately the law and the legal system construct the
range of understandings of the permissible in social behavior." 4 That
construction will be without meaning, and certainly without alle-
giance, if it fails to match the reality of all whom the law rules.
Something else besides these texts of the legal profession was felt
as natural, and naturally the consequence of the social justice consti-
tuted or allowed by the law, when Overtown erupted in a different
kind of legal event." 5 Perhaps the text of the "Overtown riots" can
be found in a petition circulated at the time in the community:
Miami officialdom is suggesting the real crime is that Black
people rose up .... Outrageous racist smears have come from the
lips of city officials. A police spokesman went before national TV
114. See Casebeer, supra note 105.
115. See supra note 7.
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cameras to call those arrested in the rebellion "dirt bags." Com-
missioner Rosario Kennedy said things "... just exploded, maybe
they were drunk, we just don't know."
*Has the Commissioner failed to notice the grinding poverty in
Overtown, the many-sided and often official brutality enacted on
its residents? ... Why Overtown would erupt into rebellion is no
mystery. 116
On the streets, law and the legal system are one and the same. The
petition opens with the words: "They shoot us down like black
birds."' "7 Statistics may lie, but it is impossible to make up facts like
those the words of the petition reveal. The referents of the words
chosen as descriptions reveal an indictment of the social justice of law
that could not be conceptualized at all if not for the reality of those
words for the people who live them." 8 The residents did not charge
in a series of contestable propositions that, "Government officials
charged with the function of law enforcement fail to restrict their
intentions to the line of neutral duty in discretionarily exercising
lethal fire against or involving persons who happen to be of color."
The artifact of discourse reveals the point at which the meaning of the
pervasive presence of law is known as oppression rather than
emancipation.
Justice Brennan joined the brief and poignant remarks of Justice
Blackmun dissenting from City of Richmond:
I never thought I would live to see the day when the city of Rich-
mond, Virginia, the cradle of the old Confederacy, sought on its
own, within a narrow confine, to lessen the stark impact of persis-
tent discrimination .... Yet this Court, the supposed bastion of
equality, strikes down Richmond's efforts as though discrimination
had never existed or was not demonstrated in this particular
litigation....
So the Court today regresses. I am confident, however, that,
given time, it one day again will do its best to fulfill the great prom-
ise of the Constitution's Preamble and of the guarantees embodied
in the Bill of Rights-a fulfillment that would make this Nation
very special."' 19
116. Petition, Overtown Erupts! We Won't Be Silent Either (copy on file with the
University of Miami Law Review).
117. Id.
118. The experience of living in Overtown expressed descriptively as the experience of black
birds is their reality. If the description were first stated in more neutral narrative terms, it
could then be rhetorically sharpened as metaphor. For a companion argument that metaphor,
particularly in law, constructs context and organizes experience, see Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1107
(1989).
119. 109 S. Ct. at 757 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Which text will be the harbinger of spring this year? History
probably will record none of the speech, the case, the special panel,
except as textual artifacts in a vast computer memory, more remote
yet than dusty, crumbling boxes of decayed paper randomly plun-
dered by present historians. The hidden ideological connections of
such autonomous events provide unlikely candidates for an artificial
reconstruction of the time. The vitality of the struggle for social jus-
tice at any particular moment is obscured by the normality of Robert
Cole Lecture Series, city councils, and AALS ad hoc committees.
The attack on human freedom in the reduction of access to resources,
to ideas, to law itself, passes unseen, unfelt, unnoticed.
Something else, again on the surface normal and nonideological,
will catch the eye or the search program to mark the inauspicious
beginnings of January, 1989. And oh yes, George Bush was inaugu-
rated as forty-first President of the United States. 20
120. Simultaneously, Dan Quayle was sworn in as Vice President.
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